Image 7
portrait of Ellul A
*Jacques Ellul, ©Rerun
Productions*

NEVER MIND WHERE, SO LONG AS IT'S FAST

Jacques Ellul and La Technique

Jan van Boeckel

French philosopher Jacques Ellul (1912–1994) wrote almost 60 books and many hundreds of articles. He was one of the first to argue that technology is the decisive factor that determined the character of Western society in the 20th century. In his first book on the subject, *La Technique* ('The Technological Society'), which went largely neglected by the general public, he described how technology had become autonomous, growing beyond our control to wield decisive influence over human society and behaviour. In a provocative article he even insisted that Hitler had in fact won the war, as unlimited technical thinking, guided almost exclusively by considerations of efficiency and goal-directed rationality, now holds sway almost universally, at the expense of other values which may have guided human action. In technological society, all forms of human activity, whether personal behavior or organised social and economic activity, have become fundamentally adaptive to this dominant logic.

For this reason, Ellul preferred the term 'technique' to 'technology', indicating by it not a particular machine or procedure but rather 'the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency… in every field of human activity.'

He argued that technology has become an environment: the technological milieu – our technotope – is not only the place where we live, but it also makes living possible and forces change; it obliges us to transform who we are because of the problems arising from the milieu itself.

AMSTERDAM, 1996: Ivan Illich sighs. 'I never *watch* films; the images just keep haunting me.' Some weeks earlier we had sent him a copy of our documentary on French philosopher Jacques Ellul, his great friend and teacher, who had died in 1994. Six months before, in 1993, Illich had travelled to Bordeaux (a city where Ellul once served as deputy mayor), to give an address in his honour, expressing his gratitude to 'a master to whom I owe an orientation that has decisively affected my pilgrimage for 40 years.'

We were two young Dutch film-makers who had been hoping that, when Illich saw the film, he would be more inclined to accept our request to make a documentary portrait of him as well. 'Did you receive our film on Jacques Ellul?' we ask. 'Yes, yes, and I am very thankful for it; I immediately forwarded it to friends in Santiago de Chile and I am sure that they will make great use of it!' 'But did you like it?' we press, assuming the Austrian philosopher and theologian would be eager to see one of the very few documentaries that has ever been made about his close friend. And then there is the revelation: *I never watch films*. Illich was in no way interested in developing an active working relation with modern media.

An hour or so earlier he had given his presentation at the *Doors of Perception* conference on the theme of 'speed'. When he entered the stage, no-one in the audience could fail to see the tumour about the size and shape of a small head of cauliflower on the right side of his face. From the very start, it was clear which perspective he would pursue. He opened his talk this way: 'From the tone of those lectures I have heard so far, it is obvious that I am addressing people *imprisoned* in the age of speed.'

The author of *Medical Nemesis* (1975) told us that his doctors had advised him in the strongest possible terms that the tumour needed to be removed if he was to survive. But he refused to have the operation, in accordance with his critique of professionalised medicine. He had waged a bet with the physician concerned; every year that he was still alive, he would get a bottle of wine. By that time, he had collected twelve or so.

Illich was the one who pointed out that, at most schools, teaching is confused with learning (*Deschooling Society*, 1970), who stated in 1978 that the real speed of cars is just 3.7 mph, if you factor in all the social and economic costs (*Energy and Equity*). (In countries deprived of a transportation industry, people manage to achieve the same, he would add triumphantly, walking wherever

they want to go.) And in *Silence is a Commons* (1983), he would articulate his view that computers are doing to communication what fences did to pastures and cars did to streets.

As Illich acknowledged in his Bordeaux address of 1993, Ellul helped him grasp how *technique* (Ellul's more precise term for technology) has become the determining factor in our society: 'More and more, people live their lives as in a nightmare: They feel themselves ensnared in unspeakable horrors, with no means to wake up to the light of hope. As in certain nightmares, the terror transcends the expressible. Ellul's recognition of the established status of globalising *technique* allowed him to foresee in the 1950s what today is palpable but now irremediable.' The concept of *la technique* entered Illich's awareness in 1965 in California, when John Wilkinson – who, following the strong recommendation of Aldous Huxley, had just translated the book – gave him a copy of Ellul's 1954 work *The Technological Society*. Since then, Illich said, the questions raised by the concept of *la technique* had constantly reoriented his own examination of our relation to objects and to others. It permitted him to identify – in education, transport and in modern medical and scientific activities – 'the threshold at which these projects absorb, conceptually and physically, the client into the tool; the threshold where the products of consumption change into things which themselves consume; the threshold where the milieu of *technique* transforms into numbers those who are en-trapped in it; the threshold where technology is decisively trans-formed into … *the system*.'

For Illich, Jacques Ellul was one of a select few modern thinkers who understood that the place of the sacred is now occupied not by this or that artefact, but by *la technique*, the black box we worship. He declared in his lecture that it would be rational in today's world to prioritise examining the effects of *la technique* on one's own flesh and senses *before* looking at current and future damages to the environment:

> Existence in a society that has become a system finds the senses useless precisely because of the very instruments designed for their extension. One is prevented from touching and embracing reality. Further, one is programmed for inter-active communication; one's whole being is sucked into the

system. It is this radical subversion of sensation that humiliates and then replaces perception. We submit ourselves to fantastic degradations of image and sound consumption in order to anaesthetise the pain resulting from having lost reality.

This excerpt, and all others presented here in boxes, are from the film The Betrayal by Technology

Technology will not tolerate any judgment being passed on it. Or rather: technologists do not easily tolerate people expressing an ethical or moral judgment on what they do. But the expression of ethical, moral and spiritual judgments is actually the highest freedom of mankind. So I am robbed of my highest freedom. Whatever I say about technology and the technologists themselves is of no importance to them. It won't deter them from what they are doing. They are now set in their course. They are so conditioned. For a technologist is not free. He is conditioned. By his training, by his experiences and by the objective which he must reach. He is not free in the execution of his task. He does what technology demands of him. That's why I think freedom and technology contradict one another.

City dwellers live in a completely dead environment. Cities consist of brick, cement, concrete and so on. People cannot be happy in such an environment. So they suffer psychological problems. Mainly as a result of their social climate but also as a result of the speed at which they are forced to live. Yet man is specifically suited for living amidst nature. So man becomes mentally ill. And for the relief of those psychological illnesses there is human technology, just as there is medical technology. But human technology must enable man to live in an unnatural environment. As in the case of deep sea diving. Divers have a deep sea diving suit and oxygen cylinders in order to survive in an abnormal environment. Human technology is just like that.

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AMSTERDAM, 1989: Godfrey Reggio has just shown parts of the two first films – *Koyaanisqatsi* and *Powaqqatsi* (Hopi Indian words for 'life out of balance' and 'life in transformation') – of his trilogy on how humans turn the earth from a biotope into a technotope (Ellul's term). The title of this seminar is 'The End of Nature'; a choir sings the Hopi Prophecies in the film: 'If we dig precious

things from the land, we invite disaster; near the Day of Purification, there will be cobwebs spun back and forth in the sky; a container of ashes might one day be thrown from the sky, which could burn the land and boil the oceans.'

When we saw the film, we had just been travelling for six months through the United States, occasionally doing voluntary work on Native American reservations across the country. We had also visited the Hopi Nation, and like Reggio, had tried to secure permission to make a film on their prophetic warnings to the modern world. The Hopi elders had advised Reggio to make a film about his own world, rather than to film the Hopi people. Through that, he could show in the 'language of the Western world' what the core of the Hopi message was. We had tried doing something similar, though on a much more modest scale. The result was *The Earth is Crying*, in which four Native Americans – Leslie Silko, Bill Wahpehah, John Graham and Floyd Westerman – come to discover our European shores, five centuries after Columbus. On their journey through The Netherlands, they visit a nuclear power station, an anthropological museum, a zoo and a peace camp and share their impressions of our way of life.

At the very, very end of Reggio's screening, when most other people had already left the cinema, he explicitly thanked Jacques Ellul and Ivan Illich (together with Hopi elder David Monongye, Guy Debord and Leopold Kohr) for their inspiration and ideas. When we came to interview him, he told how, each time he would commence working on a part of his *Qatsi* trilogy, he would start by travelling to Bordeaux to seek advice from Jacques Ellul. Sometime earlier in the conversation, we had told Reggio of our own film-making activities. Suddenly, he turns sharply in his chair. 'Ellul is becoming old. It is very important that a documentary be made on him soon. My hands are full with the directing of the final part of the trilogy [*Naqoyqatsi*, or 'life as war', JvB]. Why don't *you* make that film on Ellul? I can recommend you to him – you can always try!'

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BORDEAUX, 1990: With colleague film-makers Pat van Boeckel, Frits Steinmann and Karin van der Molen, I have come to southern France for a week to interview Ellul in his mansion, in sessions of

a few hours each day. Ellul carefully takes the time he needs to respond to our questions, sometimes reading from pre-prepared notes on a small piece of paper. For Ellul, *technique* not only includes merely machines and other technical devices but the whole complex of rationally ordered methods for making *any* human activity more efficient. In his view, this whole complex has grown into a system that has outgrown human control, even if we are able to govern individual technologies. It threatens human freedom and responsibility and it suppresses the conditions under which a solution to this predicament would seem possible. Ellul holds that every technical innovation that is implemented to solve a prior problem creates, in its turn, secondary problems that worsen the problem they were intended to resolve.

Ellul recalled that when his first book on technology came out in 1954, people did not read the warning. The book found its way onto library shelves and among the quiet studies of slightly out-dated intellectuals. It was different across the Atlantic: 'The only ones to take it seriously belonged to a society in which it was already too late to do anything – the USA. There both intellectuals and the public at large seized on my book because it described exactly what they were already experimenting with and experiencing …In France people dismissed my expositions as the reveries of a solitary walker who prefers the country to the town.'

In a society such as ours, it is almost impossible for a person to be responsible. A simple example: a dam has been built somewhere, and it bursts. Who is responsible for that? Geologists worked it out. They examined the terrain. Engineers drew up the construction plans. Workmen constructed it. And the politicians decided that the dam had to be in that spot. Who is responsible? No-one. There is never anyone responsible. Anywhere. In the whole of our technological society the work is so fragmented and broken up into small pieces that no-one is responsible. But no-one is free either. Everyone has his own, specific task. And that's all he has to do.

In the foreword to *The Technological Society*, Ellul provides what he calls an 'extrapolation' that 'never represents more than a probability, and may be proved false by events …The reader must always keep in mind the implicit presupposition that *if* man does not

pull himself together and assert himself (or if some other unpredictable but decisive phenomenon does not intervene), *then* things will go the way I describe.'

According to Ellul, the crisis that we are facing in our times entails the transition, not from one form of society and power to another, but to a new environment, the technological environment. In his view, the present change of environment is much more fundamental than anything that humans have experienced for the last five thousand years. Ellul points at the problem of 'denaturalisation'.

What is now so awful in our society is that technology has destroyed everything which people ever considered sacred. For example, nature. People have voluntarily moved to an acceptance of technology as something sacred. That is really awful. In the past, the sacred things always derived from nature. Currently, nature has been completely desecrated and we consider technology as something sacred. Think, for example, of the fuss whenever a demonstration is held. Everyone is then always very shocked if a car is set on fire. For then a sacred object is destroyed.

Living in today's world, we are out of direct contact with the realities of earth and water. Instead we deal with the reality of technical objects and instruments that more and more constitute our environment. The process of denaturalisation is so overwhelming and complete that our contact with the natural elements is almost exclusively mediated by techniques, or by what Ellul calls the technological system. The relationship between nature and the artificial has been reversed, has been thrown into disorder, and we have to situate ourselves in relationship to this, what he calls 'unbelievable reversal'. Here is how he describes the rupture in The Technological Bluff (1990):

> Regarding technical objects, there is no true symbolising in
> the primary sense anymore. What we have now is the cre-
> ation of a fictional world in which our religious sense incar-
> nates itself. Objects like televisions, computers, bikes and
> rockets acquire a fabulous dimension by reason of the sense
> of their power, their ubiquity, their domination, the unlim-

ited access that they give, their secret, which remains strange to us, and the sacred awe that we experience face to face with nuclear fission. This complex is typically religious. The religious and the sacred that we have chased out of nature are now transferred to objects. Be it noted that the transfer is not quite the same. We originally related our religious feelings to our natural environment. The tree, the fountain, the wind, the animal were the focus. We invested them with a formidable greatness and they became sacred. But the things that compose our human environment now play this role. We ourselves have not changed. We still relate our sense of the sacred to what constitutes our environment. We adore and use with joy and fear that which forms our environment, making sacrifice to it. It is the environment that has changed. But how far we are from the famous *Entzauberung der Welt*. There isn't any 'disenchantment of the world'. It is simply that the world we now know bears no relation to the human world which up to half a century ago seemed to be eternal.

But what does matter is that pessimism in a society such as ours can only lead to suicide. That's why you must be optimistic. You must spend your holiday in Disneyland. Then you are a real optimist. With all that you see there, you no longer have to think about anything else. In other words, those who accuse me of pessimism are in fact saying to me: 'You prevent people from being able to sleep peacefully. So if you let everything take its course, you never interfere, and you just go to sleep peacefully, all will end well.' I would certainly not want my words to be too pessimistic and too inaccessible. And I would like to explain that people are still people a bit – notice, I say: a bit – and they still have human needs; and they can still feel love and pity, and feelings of friendship.

It is easy to discard Ellul's warnings as coming from a blatant pessimist or fatalist. When we ask him what he thinks of that charge, he says that he doesn't regard himself as such. He makes the comparison with a physician who has diagnosed a patient's illness. 'If he tells him the truth, for example that the person concerned has a life-threatening disease, would you then call him a pessimist? Or would you call him a realist?'

There is yet another level to this, though. Ellul was fond of mak-

ing the analogy that his work was like the two parallel rails of a train track: one rail was theological, the other sociological. No train can ride on only one rail. Similarly, his 50 titles should be seen as a coherent whole. For every sociological (or, we would say, philosophical) work Ellul wrote, he wrote a theological counterpart to it. The theological books sound a tone very different from the dire warnings of his sociological books. Here the message is more one of freedom, responsibility and hope. For Ellul, these were the forces that could countervail against the rigidity of technique that was forging an autonomous system, from which any meaningful human intervention was excluded.

Ellul grew up in poverty. In the writings of Marx, he found a tool both to analyse society and to understand why his father was sitting at home, unemployed. From the beginning of his academic career, Ellul had great respect for the way in which Marx had analysed developments in the 19th century. On reflection, however, he came to the conclusion that Marx's interpretation was inadequate for understanding modern society. Where was the liberation through technology he had predicted? The much-needed transformation of the world was obviously more complex than he could have foreseen in his time. Ellul asked himself: if Marx had lived in 1940, what would he have seen as the fundamental element of society, what would he have chosen as the basis for his study? In the 19th century, the economy was the decisive factor, but in Ellul's time, it was no longer the economy, but *technique*. And so he began to study the phenomenon of technique just as Marx had studied capitalism a century earlier. Ellul did not consider himself a Marxist; in politics he was most attracted to anarchism. Given these political leanings, it comes as a surprise to many that he nevertheless saw himself first and foremost as a Christian.

In a long interview with Patrick Troude-Chastenet that has been published as a book, Ellul tells of his conversion to Christianity. It was a completely overwhelming – in his own words even violent – experience. It happened when he was 17, during the summer holidays. Ellul was staying with friends not far from Bordeaux. He was alone in a house in Blanquefort, translating Faust, when suddenly he felt himself in the presence of 'something so astounding, so overwhelming that entered me to the very centre of my being.' No words were uttered. He saw nothing. But the presence was unbelievably strong: 'I knew with every nerve in my body that I was in the presence of God.' The young Ellul was so moved that

he left the room in a stunned state. In the courtyard he found a bicycle that was lying around. Ellul jumped on it and fled. He covered dozens of kilometres, he cannot recall how many. He quickly realised that he had experienced a conversion. At no point did he have the idea that his senses were playing tricks on him. He was in excellent shape both physically and psychologically. It was not a beautiful illumination and it did not involve fear. He was *stunned*: 'Meeting God had brought a complete change in my whole being. To begin with this meant a re-ordering of my ideas. I would have to think differently now that God was near me.'

I know many people who like watching commercials because they're so funny. They provide relaxation and diversion. People come home after a day's work, from which they derive little satisfaction, and feel the need for diversion and amusement. The word diversion itself is already very significant. When Pascal uses the word diversion he means that people who follow the path of God deviate from the path which leads them to God as a result of diversion and amusement. Instead of thinking of God, they amuse themselves. So, instead of thinking about the problems which have been created by technology and our work we want to amuse ourselves. And that amusement is supplied to us by means of technology. But by means of technology which derives from human technology. For example, in a work situation people are offered the diversion which must serve as compensation.

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LINCOLN, MONTANA, 1996: Theodore Kaczynski – also known as the Unabomber – is arrested in his cabin near for murdering three people and injuring 23. In total, 16 bombs were attributed to him. One of his bombs was set on a Boeing 727 airliner, but the detonating system was faulty causing the pilot to make an emergency landing. Kaczynski also sent out several deadly mail bombs to a variety of people, including a computer store owner, a computer science professor and a PR agent for Exxon Valdez.

In 1995, he announced that he would put an end to his bombings if his manifesto, 'Industrial Society and its Future', would be published in major newspapers. Yielding to pressure by the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, the text was eventually published in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*. Family of Kaczynski recognised his writing and their tip-off eventually led to his arrest in a small cabin in the woods.

The question now is whether people are prepared or not to realise that they are dominated by technology. And to realise that technology oppresses them, forces them to undertake certain obligations and conditions them. Their freedom begins when they become conscious of these things. For when we become conscious of that which determines our life we attain the highest degree of freedom. I must make sure that I can analyse it, just as I can analyse a stone or any other object, that I can analyse it and fathom it from all angles. As soon as I can break down this whole technological system into its smallest components my freedom begins. But I also know that, at the same time, I'm dominated by technology. So I don't say, 'I'm so strong that technology has no hold on me.' Of course technology has a hold on me. I know that very well. Just take … a telephone, for example, which I use all the time. I'm continually benefiting from technology.

Some parts of the manifesto are strikingly reminiscent of Ellul's views. Take this one:

> … most individuals are unable to influence measurably the major decisions that affect their lives. There is no conceivable way to remedy this in a technologically advanced society. The system tries to 'solve' this problem by using propaganda to make people *want* the decisions that have been made for them, but even if this 'solution' were completely successful in making people feel better, it would be demeaning.

Or this:

> The system does not and cannot exist to satisfy human needs. Instead, it is human behaviour that has to be modified to fit the needs of the system. This has nothing to do with the political or social ideology that may pretend to guide the technological system. It is not the fault of capitalism and it is not the fault of socialism. It is the fault of technology, be-

cause the system is guided not by ideology but by technical necessity.

Throughout the 18-year search for the identity of the Unabomber, the FBI compiled very little concrete information about the perpetrator. But they had come to the same conclusion: the Unabomber was a neo-Luddite, and, at that, one who was very familiar with the writings of the French philosopher Jacques Ellul. The Unabomber used an uncommon amount of Ellul's vocabulary.

The media era is also the era of loneliness. That's a very important fact. We can also see that in the young. In 1953 you had the so-called 'rebels without a cause'. Students who revolted in Stockholm. That was the first revolt of the young rebels without a cause. They had everything. They were happy. They lived in a nice society. They lacked nothing. And suddenly, on New Year's Eve, they took to the streets and destroyed everything. No one could understand it. But they needed something different from consumption and technology. If people lose their motive for living, two things can happen. It only seldom happens that they can accept that fact. In that case, they develop suicidal tendencies. Either they try to find refuge in diversion. We've already discussed this. Or they become depressed and begin swallowing medicines. So if people become aware of their situation they react to it in ways of what usually happens in Western society: they become depressed and discouraged. So they just don't think about their situation and simply carry on. They drive faster and faster. Never mind where, as long as it's fast.

In a pre-trial interview, Kaczynski acknowledged Ellul's immense influence on his thinking, along with his reverence for the philosopher. Somewhere early in the 1970s, after he had moved to Montana, Kaczynski read *The Technological Society*. He was greatly enthused by his reading of it, considering it a masterpiece: 'I thought, look, this guy is saying things I have been wanting to say all along.' When the FBI searched his cabin, they discovered a small but impressive library containing several books by Ellul. It is perhaps significant, however, that none of Ellul's theological works were found; only his philosophical and sociological work concerning technology.

Because of our technology, we now have a world in which the situation of mankind has totally changed. What I mean by that is: mankind in the technological world is prepared to give up his independence in exchange for all kinds of facilities and in exchange for consumer products and a certain security. In short, in exchange for a package of welfare provisions offered to him by society. As I was thinking about that, I couldn't help recalling the story in the Bible about Esau and the lentil broth. Esau, who is hungry, is prepared to give up the blessings and promise of God in exchange for some lentil broth. In the same way, modern people are prepared to give up their independence in exchange for some technological lentils. The point is simply that Esau made an extremely unfavourable exchange and that the person who gives up his position of independence lets himself be badly duped too, by the technological society. It boils down to the fact that he gives up his independence in exchange for a number of lies. He doesn't realise that he is manipulated in his choice. That he is changed internally by advertisements, by the media and so on. And when you think that the manipulator, the author of advertisements or propaganda, is himself manipulated, then you cannot point to one culprit as being responsible. It is neither the advertiser nor his poor public. We are all responsible, to the same extent.

Towards the end of the interview, Kaczynski relates a poignant personal story about the close relationship he had developed with a snowshoe rabbit. His interviewer asks if he wants him to turn off the audio-recording, but he says it is not necessary. If one didn't know more about the background of the man at the other end of the microphone, one could easily get the impression of listening to a storyteller round the campfire at a festival:

While I was living in the woods I sort of invented some gods for myself … Not that I believed in these things intellectually, but they were ideas that sort of corresponded with some of the feelings I had. I think the first one I invented was Grandfather Rabbit. You know the snowshoe rabbits were my main source of meat during the winters. I had spent a lot of time learning what they do and following their tracks all around before I could get close enough to shoot them. Sometimes you would track a rabbit around and around and then the tracks disappear. You can't figure out where that rabbit went and lose the trail. I invented a myth for myself, that this was the Grandfather Rabbit, the grandfather who was responsi-

ble for the existence of all other rabbits. He was able to disappear, that is why you couldn't catch him and why you would never see him … Every time I shot a snowshoe rabbit, I would always say 'thank you Grandfather Rabbit.' After a while I acquired an urge to draw snowshoe rabbits. I sort of got involved with them to the extent that they would occupy a great deal of my thought. I actually did have a wooden object that, among other things, I carved a snowshoe rabbit in. I planned to do a better one, just for the snowshoe rabbits, but I never did get it done. There was another one that I sometimes called the Will o' the Wisp, or the wings of the morning. That's when you go out in to the hills in the morning and you just feel drawn to go on and on and on and on, then you are following the wisp. That was another god that I invented for myself.

Where Kaczynski sought with his manifesto to overthrow technology by force, Ellul in *The Technological Society* explicitly declines to offer any solution at all. Ellul insisted that his intention was only to diagnose the problem and not to prescribe a treatment. He realised that his analysis seemed despairing, but yet, as we saw, he didn't regard himself as a pessimist. For him, there was always room for hope, even if it has to rely on the possibility of miracle.

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Most of our interview sessions with Ellul in 1990 take place in his visitors' room. At our very first question, the initial moment of filming, we ask him to define the word technology. In the middle of the first sentence of his answer, as if by divine intervention, a lighting fuse breaks. 'Technology with a capital T…' and then the image jumps to total darkness. We chose to have this initial moment of power failure at the very start of our film.

One of the last shots we make is of Ellul writing at his desk in his studio. In order to enter it, we first have to transverse the garden. We ask if we can follow him while walking, otherwise viewers will only see him sitting on his chair. Ellul reluctantly complies. He doesn't like it. 'But I know for a film, one has to allow this vampirism', he says. We film him writing amidst towers of loosely piled papers and books, suggesting he is fully occupied with his studies. He hands us the paper he scribbled on. Only later do we

read what he actually wrote: 'It is a great joy to have been able to speak so freely about the things that have been of such concern for me throughout my life.'

Reykjavik, May 2015

We are surrounded by objects which are, it is true, efficient but they are absolutely pointless. A work of art, on the other hand, has meaning in various ways or it calls up in me a feeling or an emotion whereby my life acquires sense. That is not the case with a technological product. And on the other hand we have the obligation to rediscover certain fundamental truths which have disappeared because of technology. We can also call these truths values, important, actual values, which ensure that people experience their lives as having meaning. In other words, as soon as the moment arrives, when I think that the situation is really dangerous, I can't do any more with purely technological means. Then I must employ all my human and intellectual capacities and all my relationships with others to create a counterbalance. That means that when I think that a disaster threatens to happen and that developments threaten to lead to a destiny for mankind, as I wrote concerning the development of technology, I, as a member of mankind, must resist and must refuse to accept that destiny. And at that moment we end up doing what mankind has always done at a moment when destiny threatens. Just think of all those Greek tragedies in which mankind stands up against the destiny and says: No, I want mankind to survive; and I want freedom to survive.